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The Consumer Rights Act 2015 and Collective Redress for 
Competition Law Infringements in the UK: A Class Act?
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Abstract 
This article is the first in-depth academic discussion of the key aspects of the enhanced 
collective redress mechanisms introduced recently in relation to competition law 
infringements in the UK by the Consumer Rights Act. The legislation is a particularly 
significant development because of the historical and contemporary focus on the 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ?Ăƚ ƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?antitrust law and because the reforms also reflect 
ŵŽƌĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ŝŶ ůĞŐĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ? dŚĞ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ
recounts ƚŚĞ ƉŝǀŽƚĂů ƌŽůĞ ƉůĂǇĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ĐůĂƐƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶ h^ ĂŶƚitrust enforcement before 
outlining the recent debate on encouraging and facilitating private enforcement in the EU, 
particularly in relation to collective redress, culminating in the (anodyne) Commission 
Recommendation of June 2013. As the article notes, most of the collective redress 
mechanisms introduced across the EU Member States to date have been opt-in models, but 
these have been criticised for their limited impact and effectiveness, and an opt-out 
representative model has been introduced in some Member States and discussed in others. 
The article will reflect on the limited provision in the UK on collective redress in relation to 
competition law infringements prior to the Consumer Rights Act, in particular the limitations 
in the opt-in follow-on procedure under s47B of the Competition Act 1998, as demonstrated 
by CA v JJB. The  article will then focus on the Đƚ ?Ɛ provisions (and associated Tribunal rules) 
in relation to opt-in/opt-out collective proceedings and settlements (in both follow-on and 
stand-alone actions). The article will outline the new statutory provisions in sections 47B 
and 49A and B of the Competition Act 1998, for Collective Proceedings and Collective 
Settlements respectively. The Tribunal rules on certification will be considered, noting the 
potential difficulties in their practical application, before further analysis of two key 
problematic aspects of the proposed opt-out collective redress scheme, which may limit its 
effectiveness and uptake. The first concerns the appointment of the class/settlement 
representative and the second concerns the potential funding arrangements in relation to 
opt-out collective proceedings. The article questions whether the combination of these two 
aspects may dis-incentivise and unnecessarily limit the effectiveness of the new opt-out 
provisions, although it is accepted that this will also greatly depend on the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal interpretation and application of its new Tribunal Rules in relation to 
Collective proceedings, in particular regarding certification, appointment of the 
class/settlement representative and determination of the appropriate costs and expenses 
incurred in pursuing a collective claim. 
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Introduction 
 This article will provide a critical academic discussion of the key aspects of the dramatically 
enhanced collective redress mechanisms introduced recently in the UK in relation to 
competition law infringements by the Consumer Rights Act 2015. There has been extensive 
academic debate and discussion in recent years in the EU on the development of private 
enforcement of competition law,2 with considerable academic commentary recently in 
relation to the adoption by the EU of the Antitrust Damages Directive.3  However, a 
particular focus of the debate on increasing competition law private enforcement has been 
how best to deliver justice and compensation to consumers harmed by competition law 
infringements, notably price-fixing cartels. The article will first outline the background to the 
debate on collective consumer redress in the competition law context, primarily driven by 
access to justice arguments, before a brief comparative outline of the development of 
collective redress mechanisms in different legal systems. Inevitably, the discussion will start 
with the US class action mechanism, which has been instrumental in facilitating consumer 
redress.4 The article will then consider recent EU developments, and highlight the 
introduction of opt-out collective redress mechanisms in a competition law context in other 
Member States. The article will reflect on the limited provision in the UK on collective 
redress in relation to competition law infringements prior to the Consumer Rights Act, in 
particular the limitations in the opt-in follow-on procedure under s47B of the Competition 
Act 1998, as demonstrated by CA v JJB. dŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞǁŝůů ƚŚĞŶ ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞĐƚ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ
(and associated Tribunal rules) in relation to stand-alone/follow-on opt-in/opt-out collective 
proceedings and settlements (in both follow-on and stand-alone actions). The article will 
outline the likely effect of the new statutory provisions inserted into the Competition Act 
1998, for Collective Proceedings and Collective Settlements respectively.5 The Tribunal rules 
on certification will be considered, noting the potential difficulties in their practical 
application, before analysis of two further key problematic aspects of the proposed opt-out 
collective redress scheme, which may limit its effectiveness and uptake. The first concerns 
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 See A P Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law, (Hart 
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 ŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?h ? ? ? ? ? ?K:> ? ? ? ? ? ?^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉů  ?&tĞŝĚƚ ‘dŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
damages after passing thĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ?- ? ? ? ?^ŝŶŐŚ ?  ‘ŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨ>ĞŶŝĞŶĐǇ
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ PĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĂĨƚĞƌŵĂƚŚŽĨƌĞĐĞŶƚ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200-213. 
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Competition Law, (2010, Edward Elgar In association with the American Antitrust Institute); C A Jones, Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU, UK and USA, (1999, OUP:Oxford); R H Lande and J P DaviƐ ‘ĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ
ĨƌŽŵ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ P Ŷ ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ &ŽƌƚǇ ĂƐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?  hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ^ĂŶ &ƌĂŶĐŝƐĐŽ >Ăǁ
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 Note that the Act also inter alia ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ ĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ d ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ŝŶ
private enforcement:- ƐĞĞĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŶĚƌĞĂŶŐĞůŝ ? ‘dŚĞŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ
ƚŚĞh< PdŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƉƉĞĂůdƌŝďƵŶĂůďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂŶĚĂŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:
1-30; and in relation for example to CMA facilitated redress:- see for instance C Hodges  ‘Fast, Effective and 
Low Cost Redress: How Do Public and Private Enforcement and ADR Compare? ? , Ch 8 in Rodger (ed) 2014 
supra.  
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the appointment of the class/settlement representative and the second concerns the 
potential funding arrangements in relation to opt-out collective proceedings. The article 
questions whether the combination of these two aspects may dis-incentivise and 
unnecessarily limit the effectiveness of the new opt-out provisions. 
 
Consumer and Collective Redress Background 
Focusing on consumer redress in the private enforcement context is appropriate for a 
number of reasons. First, because of the historical and contemporary focus on the 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌƚ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶƚŝƚƌƵst law, whether from a neo-classical 
economic model of perfect competition and monopoly6 to the Chicago-School influence on 
h^ ĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ?ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ? ?7 to a consumer-interest 
model which has predominated in the European debate on recent years.8  Second, because 
facilitating and incentivising consumer redress chimes with more recent debates in legal 
praĐƚŝĐĞ ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?9 and facilitating consumer redress generally. Third, 
because collective redress has been developed by the European Commission as a central 
theme in the last few years in the EU debate on encouraging and facilitating private 
enforcement in the EU.10 Finally, and related to this third aspect, is the influence of the US 
antitrust enforcement system in which private enforcement has played a considerably more 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƌŽůĞƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞhŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŚĂǀĞƉůĂǇĞĚ
a pivotal role. On the one hand, the US system demonstrates the potential for consumer 
redress for competition law infringements, yet at the same time, the EU (and UK) debate on 
reform has been burdened with a fear of the over-ǌĞĂůŽƵƐůŝƚŝŐĂŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ƚŽǆŝĐĐŽĐŬƚĂŝů ?ŽĨ
ĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƐƚůǇ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ĐůĂƐƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĨŽƌŵa central 
plank.11  
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 See for instance Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Houghton Mifflin, 
3
rd
 edn, 1990); Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 edn, 2010), Ch 
2. 
7
 See R Bork, The Antitrust paradox, 2
nd
 edn, New York: Free Press, 1993. Cf &Žǆ ? ‘dŚĞďĂƚƚůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƐŽƵůŽĨ
ĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ăů ?> ?ZĞǀ ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞĂůƐŽ&ŽĞƌ ?/tŽƌŬŝŶŐWĂƉĞƌEŽ ? ? ?-09: The Goals of Antitrust: 
Thoughts on Consumer Welfare in the U.S. at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/10232; For a more 
ƌĞĐĞŶƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞ<ŽǀĂĐŝĐt ? ? ‘dŚĞ/ŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůEŽĨDŽĚĞƌŶh^ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁĨŽƌŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ&ŝƌŵ
ŽŶĚƵĐƚ PdŚĞŚŝĐĂŐŽ ?,ĂƌǀĂƌĚŽƵďůĞ,Ğůŝǆ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽůƵŵďŝĂƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? 
8
 Wyatt and Dashwood, EU law ?KǆĨŽƌĚ P,ĂƌƚWƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ś  ? ?  ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽhŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ ?; 
DĂƌƐĚĞŶWĂŶĚtŚĞůĂŶ ?W  ‘ ?ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂŶĚh<ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?
ECLR 569-585. See the impact on the debate in relation to the Commission review of Article 102 enforcement 
practice in the Commission Guidelines of 2009 at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html. 
9
 ^ĞĞ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ŐĞŶĐǇ ĨŽƌ &ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ZŝŐŚƚƐ ?  ‘ĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ŝŶ
ƵƌŽƉĞ P Ŷ KǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ĂŶĚ KƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?  ? ? ? ? Ăƚ
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1520-report-access-to-justice_EN.pdf. In the UK see for 
instance the Access to Justice Foundation at http://www.accesstojusticefoundation.org.uk/. See also J. 
Peysner, Access to Justice: A Critical Analysis of Recoverable Conditional Fees and No Win No Fee Funding 
(Palgrave MacMillan: London, 2014). 
10
 See the Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html as 
discussed further infra. See A Andreangeli 'Collective redress in EU competition law: an open question with 
many possible solutions' (2012) World Competition 3 529-558; ^ĞĞ  ? ,ŽĚŐĞƐ  ‘dŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ
:ƵƐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚZĞĚƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^ƵƉƌĞŵĞŽƵƌƚ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ?Ě ? ? ? ?-346. 
11
 See Albert E Foer and Jonathon W Cuneo The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law (AAI, Edward Elgar, 2010), Part II in particular and A Andreangeli  ‘A view from across the 
Atlantic: recent developments in the case law of the US Federal courts on class certification in antitrust cases ?
Chap. 7 in Rodger (ed) 2014 supra and Private Enforcement of Antitrust- Regulating Corporate Behaviour 
through Collective Claims in the EU and US (2014 Edward Elgar). See also ,ĞĨĨĞƌŶĂŶ> ? ‘ŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞŽŵŵŽŶ
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There has been considerable academic study and literature in relation to collective 
consumer redress generally, led by the work of Rachel Mulheron,12 and empirical work 
which has highlighted major gaps in redress for consumers specifically in relation to 
competition law infringements.13 The 2013 Commission Recommendation14 provided the 
following definition of collective redress as follows:- 
  ?Ă ?  ‘ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ? ŵĞĂŶƐ  ?ŝ ? Ă ůĞŐĂů ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ƚŚĂƚ ĞŶƐƵƌĞƐ Ă ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĐůĂŝŵ
cessation of illegal behaviour collectively by two or more natural or legal persons or by an 
entity entitled to bring a representative action (injunctive collective redress); (ii) a legal 
mechanism that ensures a possibility to claim compensation collectively by two or more 
natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed in a mass harm situation or by an 
ĞŶƚŝƚǇ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ƚŽ ďƌŝŶŐ Ă  ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ  ?ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŽƌǇ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ? ? ?15
Accordingly, although there is obviously and  intentionally, considerable overlap between 
ƚŚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐĨŽƌ ‘ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƉůĂǇĞĚďǇĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐŝŶĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƐƐ
to justice in a competition law context, collective redress and consumer redress do not 
necessarily fully coincide.16 
 
US Class actions 
Essentially, the US legal system has for a considerable period promoted access to the courts 
for consumers through group lawsuits as this spreads the potential fees and costs burden, 
and may counteract the inertia of potential individual claimants in diffuse delicts/torts 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Law Approaches to Multi Party >ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ůĂƐƐ ĐƚŝŽŶ WƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?   h>:  ? ? ? ?For 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐĞĞ^ĐŚŶĞůů ?' ‘ůĂƐƐĐƚŝŽŶDĂĚŶĞƐƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ- 
ĂĐĂůůĨŽƌĂŵŽƌĞďĂůĂŶĐĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ?-619.
12
 For some of the work undertaken in this field by Rachael Mulheron, see The Class Action in Common Law 
Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004); 'Recent Milestones in Class Actions 
Reform in England: A Critique and a Proposal' (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Rev 288-315; 'Opting In, Opting Out, 
and Closing the Class: Some Dilemmas for England's Class Actions Law-Makers' (2011) 50 Canadian Business 
LJ 376-408; 'The Impetus for Class Actions Reform in England Arising From the Competition Law Sector' in S 
Wrbka et al (eds), Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (CUP, 
Cambridge, 2012), ch 15, 385 W412;  ‘ ŵŝƐƐĞĚ 'Ğŵ ŽĨ ĂŶ KƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ZƵůĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?
EBLRev 49-60. 
13
 Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A Perspective of Need (Report submitted to the Civil 
Justice Council of England and Wales, February 2008). 
14
 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law, 
June 2013, (2013) OJ L201/60, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32013H0396:EN:NOT 
the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law 
15
 Ibid. para. 3. The ancillary Commission Communication, (COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, "Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress", 
Strasbourg, 11.6.2013, COM(2013) 401 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/docs/com_2013_401_en.pdf. ) further noted at para. 3.2 that:- 
 ‘ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĚƌĞƐƐŝƐĂƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂůŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ that allows, for reasons of procedural economy and/or efficiency 
of enforcement, many similar legal claims to be bundled into a single court action. Collective redress facilitates 
access to justice in particular in cases where the individual damage is so low that potential claimants would not 
think it worth pursuing an individual claim. It also strengthens the negotiating power of potential claimants 
and contributes to the efficient administration of justice, by avoiding numerous proceedings concerning claims 
ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨůĂǁ ? ? 
16
 See further infra re the collective redress model under the Consumer Rights Act. 
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where the small value of potential individual awards may discourage court action.
17
 
ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ƌĞůǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƉƌŽŽĨ ? ŵĂǇ ĂůƐŽ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ
adjudication by the civil court system.18  The key element in the US is the opt-out nature of 
the class action mechanism, provided for in Rule 23 of the US Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Although the opt-out basis is crucial in ensuring widespread compensation,19 in 
applying Rule 23 the courts have had to reconcile this underlying aim of efficient 
adjudication with other potentially conflicting principles such as party autonomy and due 
process requirements. There are certain key requirements which have to be satisfied under 
Rule 23 before a court will certify a class action. According to ZƵůĞ  ? ?  “ŽŶĞ Žƌ ŵŽƌĞ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨĂĐůĂƐƐŵĂǇƐƵĞŽƌďĞƐƵĞĚĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨĂůůŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?
if the class is sufficiently large to make the joinder of individual claims impracticable and 
there are questions of fact and/or of law that are common to the class.   
Moreover, Rule 23 requires the claims (or defences) of the representative parties to be 
 ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ?ŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞƚŽďĞĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĂƚĐůĂƐƐ ?dŚĞ
former requirement is aimed at avoiding a conflict of interests between the named 
representative and the class members;20 the latter has a similar foundation but the need for 
a class lawyer to be sufficiently qualified, experienced and competent to conduct class 
action litigation also stems from the recognition of the force of res judicata of a class action 
judgment against absent class members.21 In ensuring the balance between efficiency and 
due process, two further conditions were introduced in 1966:- that there existed 1) a 
predominance of common over individual issues arising from the dispute and that a class 
action was superior to other methods of fairly and efficiently adjudicating the dispute.  
Accordingly, although opt-out class actions have been central to the enhanced role for 
private antitrust enforcement in the USA over the last 40 years at least, the class 
certification process in that context should not simply be viewed as a rubber-stamping 
process. Moreover, it is evident that the courts dealing with class certification motions 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞĂ ‘ĐĂƌĞĨƵůƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?22 as to whether the requirements in Rule 23 are satisfied, and 
case-law and academic commentary indicates a significantly more rigorous approach to 
certification in recent years,23 which may reign in any of the perceived excesses of the US 
opt-out class action mechanism.24 In re: Hydrogen peroxide, the Supreme Court stressed 
                                                          
17
 See generally Olson The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1963). See A 
Andreangeli,  ‘ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĚƌĞƐƐŝŶhŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶůĂǁ PĂŶŽƉĞŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŵĂŶǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? (2012) 
35(3) W Comp 529;  ‘A view from across the Atlantic: recent developments in the case law of the US Federal 
courts on class certification in antitrust cases ?ŚĂp. 7 in Rodger (ed) 2014 supra and Private Enforcement of 
Antitrust- Regulating Corporate Behaviour through Collective Claims in the EU and US (2014 Edward Elgar). 
18
 See eg Hawaii v Standard Oil, 405 US 251 at 266. 
19
 And thereby in an antitrust context indirectly promoting the concept of competitive markets:-see Elzinga 
and Breit, The Antitrust Penalties: a study in law and economics, (1976: New Haven, MA, Yale University Press), 
at pp. 3-4. 
20
 Newberg and Conte, Newberg on class actions (hereinafter referred to as Newberg), 4
th
 edition, (2011, 
Thomson Reuters) s 18.8; see e.g. Sunrise Toyota Ltd v Toyota Motors Ltd, 55 FRD 519 at 532-33. 
21
 ^ĞĞĞ ?Ő ?^ĐŽƚƚ ? ‘ŽŶ ?ƚĨŽƌŐĞƚŵĞ ?dŚĞĐůŝĞŶƚŝŶĂĐůĂƐƐĐƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁƐƵŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?'ĞŽ ?:>ĞŐĂůƚhics 561, pp. 
569-570 and 573-574; also Newberg, 40.   
22
 AmChem Products Inc v Windsor, 83 F. 3d, 610 at 616.  
23
  Subject to  ‘ƐĐƌƵƉƵůŽƵƐƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?ƉĞƌRe Hydrogen peroxide Antitrust litigation 552 F. 3d 305 (3rd Cir. 2008).  
The close or scrupulous scrutiny requirement) raises another problem in that it requires an increasing amount 
of evidence before trial and disclosure.  
24
 ^ĞĞĞ ?Ő ?ZĂũƐŬŝ ? ‘/ŶZĞ PŚǇĚƌŽŐĞŶWĞƌŽǆŝĚĞ PƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĨŽƌĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
34 Seattle UL Rev 577 at 603- ? ? ? ?ŽŶĞĂŶĚǀĂŶƐ ? ‘ůĂƐƐĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞŵĞƌŝƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵŬĞ>
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that each requirement of Rule 23 must be met and that class certification requires a 
thorough examination of the factual and legal allegations. Accordingly, a district court errs 
as a matter of law when it fails to resolve a genuine legal or factual dispute relevant to 
determining the certification requirements. In that case, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
way the District Court had dealt with the issue of predominance and vacated the class 
certification order. 
The key point is that the US courts have sought to reconcile and balance the conflicting 
principles underlying the class action mechanism, but the more scrupulous approach in this 
context may indeed discourage class action claims and thereby weaken the class action as 
an enforcement tool and method of ensuring collective consumer redress. This is 
particularly significant given recent debates generally in the EU, and more specifically in the 
UK in relation to the Consumer Rights Act, regarding the impact of introducing an opt-out 
collective mechanism. The EU ultimately decided not to propose the opt-out class action 
model,25 and the fear of over-incentivising lawyers has clearly influenced the Parliamentary 
debate in the UK during the passage of the Consumer Rights Bill. 
As noted above, the second and related facet that drives US private enforcement generally, 
and class actions in particular, is the funding of actions, reliant on the availability of 
contingency fees.26 No win-no fee contingency fees appeal to potential claimants because of 
the absence of the risk of having to pay considerable legal fees should a claim be 
unsuccessful. They also incentivise lawyers because, in the event of success, the lawyers 
take a percentage of the overall damages award or agreed settlement sum; this is generally 
circa. 30% of the antitrust damages awarded. This can lead to very profitable work for 
lawyers where antitrust settlements can be upwards of $1bn in some cases, partly as a 
result of the threat of treble damages. Nonetheless, although lawyer  ‘greed ? and 
profitability has been a central concern during the passage of the relevant provisions of the 
Consumer Rights Act through Parliament, the empirical study by Lande and Davis of 
antitrust contingency fees in US antitrust settlement, demonstrated the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the courts27 and the general acceptance by those courts of the 
appropriateness of fee levels in settled antitrust disputes. 28 
The misconceptions about the US class action mechanism:- the  perceived lack of 
supervision of class counsel in the US class system and the fee incentives to lawyers;  has 
meant that the debate in Europe generally, and the UK specifically has been driven by a 
generalised (and unsubstantiated) fear about the creation of a system driven by ambulance-
chasing lawyers maximising self-interest at the expense of the class,29  ‘ďůĂĐŬŵĂŝůŝŶŐ ?
defendants into settling for vast sums.30  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
J 1251 at 1328- ? ? ? ? ?:ĂĐŽďƐŽŶĂŶĚŚŽŝ ? ‘ƵƌƚĂŝůŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĐůĂƐƐĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
66 NYUANSAL 549 at 554-555.  
25
 See further infra. 
26
 See C Wildfang and S P ^ůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ‘&ƵŶĚŝŶŐ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ŝŶAlbert E Foer and Jonathon W Cuneo The 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law (AAI, Edward Elgar, 2010).  
27
 As provided for in Rule 23 FRCP. 
28
 See Lande and Davis,  ‘ĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ P Ŷ ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ &ŽƌƚǇ ĂƐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ?
University of San Francisco Law Review 879, although their sample selection is skewed towards bigger cases 
with (greater) benefits. 
29
 ^ĞĞŝŶƚĞƌĂůŝĂ,ĞůǀĞƐƚŽŶ ? ‘WƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐũƵƐƚŝĐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇŝŶĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?&>
Rev 749 at 777- ? ? ? ?ĂůƐŽdŝĚŵĂƌƐŚ ? ‘ZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇŽĨƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dǆ ?>ZĞǀ ? ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ?-
1158. 
30
 Cf the tone and conclusions of the Taylor Report and also the current Scottish Government Consultation on 
Expenses and Funding of Civil Litigation in Scotland, discussed further below. 
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EU debate on Collective Redress 
The EU competition law enforcement landscape has been changing, albeit slowly, since the 
EU Commission began to encourage private enforcement since the early 1990s; partly to 
enhance the deterrence and effectiveness of EU competition law and alleviate its own 
resource limitations. The Ashurst Report and subsequent Green and White Papers on 
 ‘ĂŵĂŐĞƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ ZƵůĞƐ ? ?31 had demonstrated the 
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ƚŽ ĨĂĐŝů ƚĂƚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ůĂǁ
enforcement across the EU, to allow for a new wave of litigation  following the 2002 
Leniency notice and the so-called European cartel enforcement revolution.32 There was 
discussion in DG Comp about the possibility of introducing a sector specific collective 
redress mechanism, but the Commission decided to proceed on a horizontal basis with a 
ƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐĂĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ? ?33 
aimed at identifying common legal principles on collective redress and to examine how they 
ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂĚĂƉƚĞĚƚŽĨŝƚƚŚĞhDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂŶĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞůĞŐĂůŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ
then 27 EU Member States, prior to the accession of Croatia. The European Parliament 
made an important contribution to this process particularly by adoption of its resolution of 2 
February 2012, also entitled- "Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress".34 In this period there was also a Collective Redress Study produced for DG for 
Internal Policies,35 which proposed the following as the key legal objectives of an antitrust 
collective redress mechanism- 
 ?ŝ ? ƚŽ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ƵŶŵĞƌŝƚŽƌŝŽƵƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ŚĂǀĞ actually 
suffered harm obtain and adequate and fair compensation; 
(ii) to ensure a fair trial by providing legal certainty and consistency; 
(iii) to lower the financial and organisational hurdles that consumers and small businesses 
ĨĂĐĞ ? ?36 It proceeded to consider that an opt-out mechanism should be exceptionally 
permitted, partly due to the low participation in opt-in models.   
Subsequently the European Commission published its Communication and 
Recommendation on Collective Redress in June 2013. The key choice in determining an 
appropriate collective redress model, is whether to allow opt-in or opt-out forms of action. 
Under an opt-in model the claimants must take action to be included in the class, whereas 
in the opt-out system claimants, who have the same interest, are automatically included in 
the class by default unless they express exclusion from the class. Accordingly this model can 
ƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚĂŶĚĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĐŽƐƚƐ ?dŚĞŽƉƚ-ŝŶƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĂƚ “ ?ƌ ?ĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in the lawsuit would result in freezing out the 
claims of people  W especially small claims held by small people  W who for one reason or 
                                                          
31
 ƐŚƵƌƐƚ ‘^ƚƵĚǇŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐůĂŝŵƐĨŽƌĂŵĂŐĞƐŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨ/ŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶZƵůĞƐ ? ? ? ?st 
August 2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.  
32
 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see A ZŝůĞǇ ? ‘ĞǇŽŶĚ>ĞŶŝĞŶĐǇ PŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ?5) 28(3) World Competition 377-400. 
33
 See generally http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#comrec. 
34
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0021+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
35
 See DG for Internal Policies, Policy Department, Economic and Scientific Policy, Collective Redress in 
Antitrust Study 2012, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120613ATT46782/20120613ATT46782E
N.pdf. 
36
 Ibid at p12. 
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another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal matters, will simply not 
take the affirmative step. [..] In [such] circumstances [..] it seems fair for the silent to be 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂƐƐ ? ?37 There is also a risk that after the initial class action a 
defendant may still face a large group of consumers that may attempt to use the precedent 
value of the initial successful opt-ŝŶĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ “ĨƌĞĞƌŝĚĞ ?ƚŽďƌŝŶŐǁĂǀĞƐŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞ
individual claims.38  
The 2013 Commission Communication noted that business stakeholders opposed ƚŚĞ ‘ŽƉƚ-
ŽƵƚ ? ŵŽĚĞů ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǀŝĞǁed it as desirable in delivering effective 
justice.39 It, however, considered that the opt-out model curtailed claimant freedom in 
making informed decisions, and, rather bizarrely, that it may be inconsistent with the 
central aim of collective redress on the basis that parties are not identified and accordingly 
an award cannot be distributed to them.40  
The Commission recommended that Member States should have collective redress 
mechanisms in place to ensure effective access to justice, but the general rule is that these 
should be based on the opt-in model, with exceptional resort to an opt-out model justified 
on the basis of the sound administration of justice.41 Furthermore, the Recommendation 
provides that Member States should not permit contingency fees and punitive damages are 
to be prohibited.42 However, the continued ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ŽƉƚ-ŽƵƚ ? ŵŽĚĞůin the EU 
ƐĞĞŵƐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h^ ĨĞĚĞƌĂů ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?  “ĐĂƌĞĨƵů ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?
approach to certification.43 Nonetheless, as will become clear, the reform of collective 
redress in the UK has not been fully constrained by the EU Commission scepticism regarding 
opt-out mechanisms. 
 
EU Member States and Collective Redress 
Despite the ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐƌĞluctance to consider an opt-out model, it was noted, following 
ƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐtŚŝƚĞWĂƉĞƌƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ “The opt-out mechanism is present  W albeit 
in various forms  W in four major European countries. It is as much part of this European 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌŵŽĚĞů ? ?44 Delatre indicated that class action mechanism can act as 
Ă ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ? Ă  ‘ŶƵĚŐĞ ?45 in which the model of passive consent overcomes the 
traditional mode of rational apathy, exemplified by the incredibly low rates of participation 
                                                          
37
  ? <ĂƉůĂŶ ?  ‘ŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ tŽƌŬ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝǀŝů ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ P  ? ? ? ? ŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ &ĞĚĞƌĂů ZƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ŝǀŝů
WƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ?/ ? ?81 Harvard Law Review, 356, at 397-8 
38
 t ?ǇƐŬĞŶƐĂŶĚE ?<ĂůƵŵĂ ? ‘KƉƚ-out is Hardly an Option Chapter  W ůĂƐƐĂŶĚ'ƌŽƵƉĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?
in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and Group Actions, 2012 (Global Legal Group in 
Association with CDR). 
39
 Supra para 3.4. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Commission Recommendation supra n14 at para 21. 
42
 Ibid at paras 30-31. 
43
 See A Andreangeli  ‘A view from across the Atlantic: recent developments in the case law of the US Federal 
courts on class certification in antitrust cases ?ŚĂƉ ?  ? ŝŶZŽĚŐĞƌ  ?ĞĚ ?  ? ? ? ?ƐƵƉƌĂĂŶĚPrivate Enforcement of 
Antitrust- Regulating Corporate Behaviour through Collective Claims in the EU and US (2014 Edward Elgar). 
44
 ^ĞĞ : ? ' ? ĞůĂƚƌĞ ?  ‘ĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ tŚŝƚĞ WĂƉĞƌ P ƌĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ WƌŽƉŽƐĂů ŽŶ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĂŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚ
ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ŽŵƉ ? > ? ZĞǀ ? ƉƉ ? ?-58. See also Gaudet ? Z ? ?dƵƌŶŝŶŐ Ă ůŝŶĚ ǇĞ P ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
Rejection of Opt-ŽƵƚůĂƐƐĐƚŝŽŶƐKǀĞƌůŽŽŬƐ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚ ?EŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶ ?ĂŶŝƐŚĂŶĚƵƚĐŚǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z
30(3), 107-117. ,ĞĨĨĞƌŶĂŶ> ?  ‘ŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞŽŵŵŽŶ>ĂǁƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽDƵůƚŝWĂƌƚǇ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ American 
ůĂƐƐĐƚŝŽŶWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?h>: ? ? ? ? 
45
 R H Thaler and C R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (Caravan, Yale 
University Press, Yale 2008). 
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in opt-in actions. Given that an individual consumer is likely to be seeking a very minimal 
sum, it may be difficult to encourage that person to seek redress due to the potential costs 
involved in litigation- and this is one of the reasons that collective redress acts as an 
incentive. Across the Member States we can observe a spectrum of potential mechanisms 
which may provide for collective redress for consumers.46 Clearly, most of the collective 
redress mechanisms across the EU to date have been opt-in models, but these have been 
criticised for their limited impact and effectiveness with very low take up rates. Accordingly 
a major part of the debate in the EU, and borrowing heavily from the US class action 
tradition,47 has been whether an opt-out mechanism should be adopted, and there are 
already examples of an opt-out representative model in various Member states already. 
Furthermore, in various Member State there have been recent and ongoing reform 
discussions in this ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ĂŶĚ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ
across certain Member States in the last few years.  Accordingly, while the recent non-
binding Recommendation by the Commission is important in seeking to build a consensus,48 
and a minimum level playing field across Europe in a way that supports, encourages and 
ĂĐƚŝǀĂƚĞƐ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ  ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĨĞĂƌĨƵů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĐůĂƐƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚĂďůy 
cautious and conservative given recent reforms and on-going discussions in certain Member 
States at least.  The point is that this is not a process in which the UK is isolated, albeit, the 
reforms should place the UK at the forefront of competition law consumer redress in the 
EU. However it is important to stress the marginal role played by consumers to date in the 
enforcement of competition law through the courts in the EU. In research led by the author 
across EU member States between 1 May 1999 and 1 May 2012, of all the  competition law 
case-law, only 3.6% weƌĞ ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ ? ? ?A? individual consumer cases and 0.4% 
involving aggreŐĂƚĞĚ ? ?ĐůĂƐƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌĐĂƐĞƐǁŝƚŚ the vast majority at 96.4% comprising non-
consumer cases.49 
The EU Member States have a varied and variable landscape of provision for collective 
actions. However, appreciation of the different provision may encourage tentative sharing 
of practice about the best way forward, though not necessarily support the approach of the 
Commission, which is, perhaps inevitably, to endorse harmonisation at the lowest common 
level.50 IndeeĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ unsurprising 
given the rhetoric in relation to the toxic cocktail of mechanisms supporting the US antitrust 
class action system.51 
                                                          
46
 See  ZŽĚŐĞƌ ?  ‘ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ZĞĚƌĞƐƐ DĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ĂŶĚ ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ĂƐĞ->Ăǁ ? ŚĂƉƚĞƌ  ? ŝŶ B Rodger (ed) 
Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress Across the EU (2014 Kluwer Law 
International).  
47
 See Albert E Foer and Jonathon W Cuneo, The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law (AAI, Edward Elgar, 2010), Part II. 
48
 See discussion by D-W ?> ?dǌĂŬĂƐ ? ‘ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞZĞĚƌĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞ&ŝĞůĚŽĨŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ PƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂŶh
ƌĞŵĞĚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶZĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>ĞŐĂů/ ? ?/ ? ? ? ?-242. 
49
 See supra n 48. 
50
 ^ĞĞĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ZŵĂƌŽ ‘ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞZĞĚƌĞƐƐ ?ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂůƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ/ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞĞǀŝĐĞƐ PWůƵƌĂlity 
ŝƐƚŚĞ<ĞǇ ?ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚWĂƉĞƌ ?ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?'> ?th annual conference-  ‘ŶƚŝƚƌƵƐƚĂŵĂŐĞƐŝŶh
ůĂǁĂŶĚWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? 
51
 Amongst many statements to this effect by EU leaders, see Communication from the Commission "Towards 
ĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ,ŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞZĞĚƌĞƐƐ ? ?KD ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌĂ  ? ? ?  ? “ ‘ůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶƚŚĞ
US legal system are the best known example of a form of collective redress but also an illustration of the 
ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽĂďƵƐŝǀĞůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ'^EK ?DDK ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?
 ? “dŚĞh ?^ ? ƐƚǇůĞĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐŶŽƚĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚ ?h ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂƌĞǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?^ ? legal system 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ƚŽǆŝĐ ĐŽĐŬƚĂŝů ? ?a combination of several elements (punitive damages, contingency 
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The UK and Collective Redress 
Prior to the Consumer Rights Act, there was limited scope for collective redress in the UK 
courts, generally, and specifically in relation to competition law. In England and Wales, there 
exists the possibility of bringing a test case; consolidation and single trial of multiple actions; 
a GLO (Group Litigation order) and a representative action.52 Nonetheless the Civil Justice 
Council issued a Report outlining the limitations of each of these options and 
recommending the introduction of a new collective procedure, allowing particular cases to 
proceed on an opt-in or opt-out basis.53 In particular, the difficulties in bringing collective 
actions under existing mechanisms, at least in relation to aggregated claims by businesses, 
was demonstrated by Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc. 54 In that case the Court of 
Appeal dismissed an appeal against the High Court's earlier judgment striking-out the 
 “ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ĐůĂŝŵ ĨŽƌ ĚĂŵĂŐĞƐ ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ďǇ ŵĞƌĂůĚ ^ƵƉƉůŝĞƐ >ƚĚ ĂŶĚ
Southern Glasshouse Produce, two importers of fresh produce, against British Airways Plc 
(BA) arising from BA's breach of competition law. This was not a consumer collective claim 
but it demonstrated the limitations of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) r.19.6 on the basis 
that the purported claimant class did not all hĂǀĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐĂŵĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵ ?55  
In terms of Scottish court procedure for multi-party actions, there has been a serious debate 
regarding the introduction of a collective litigation mechanism for over thirty years.56  To 
date, no concrete reforms have been enacted. More recently, the Lord Gill (Scottish Civil 
Courts) Review (or SCCR) again recommended the introduction of a multi-party procedure.57  
The SCCR endorsed a flexible form of action where the court will decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether a class action should be opt-in or opt-out.58  The SCCR explicitly referred to 
the facts of the JJB case as the appropriate kind of situation for a court to allow an opt-out 
action to proceed.59  Much of the SCCR Review agenda is expected to be realised following 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
fees, opt-out, pre-ƚƌŝĂůĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ?. This combination of elements  W  “ƚŽǆŝĐĐŽĐŬƚĂŝů ? W should not be 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ? ůŽƐĞƌƉĂǇƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?ƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶƚŽ
exclude unmeritorious claims, and accredited associations which are authorised to take cases on behalf of 
consumers, are built into existinŐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĚƌĞƐƐƐĐŚĞŵĞƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ?^ĞĞ '^ĐŚŶĞůů ? ‘ůĂƐƐĐƚŝŽŶ
Madness in Europe- ĂĂůůĨŽƌĂDŽƌĞĂůĂŶĐĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>Z ? ? ?-619.
52
 See  ‘/ŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ ĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ dŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ Ă DŽƌĞ ĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĂŶĚ ĨĨĞĐtive 
Procedure for Collective Actions, Final Report, Nov 2008, Civil Justice Council, 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FCJC%2FPublications%2FCJC+papers%2FCJC+Improving+Ac
cess+to+Justice+through+Collective+Actions.pdf.  
53
 Ibid. 
54
 See for instance in the UK Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch). The problem was 
arguably that the claim was also brought on behalf of direct and indirect purchasers. A damages award to the 
direct purchasers logically reduces the damages award to the indirect purchasers, i.e. they do not have the 
same interest. 
55
 (2011) G.C.L.R. 4(1) R13-14.   
56
 Class Actions and the Scottish Case: A new way forward for consumers to obtain redress? (Scottish Consumer 
Council; 1982: Edinburgh); Multi-Party Actions: Report on a reference under s3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions 
Act 1965 (Scottish Law Commission; 1996: Edinburgh); C Ervine A Class of their Own: Why Scotland needs a 
class action procedure (Scottish Consumer Council; 2003: Edinburgh); a petition demanding the introduction of 
ĂĐůĂƐƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐWƵďůic Petitions Committee in March 
2009.   
57
 Report of the Scottish civil Courts Review 2009 Vol. 2 Chap. 13 Multi-Party Actions, available at 
https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/about-the-scottish-court-service/the-scottish-civil-courts-reform.   
58
 Ibid at para. 75. 
59
 Ibid at para. 79.  
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the establishment of the Scottish Civil Justice Council.
60
 Indeed the Scottish Government is 
currently consulting on its Expenses and Funding of Civil Litigation Bill. Following the Taylor 
Report,61 the consultation sets out legislative proposals to facilitate funding of civil 
litigation,62 and also sets out proposals for a multi-party action as recommended by the 
SCCR.63 The consultation sets out three alternative options:- Option 1 would be a case 
management procedure for mass litigation on an opt-in basis;64 Option 2 would be to 
introduce a full class action procedure on an opt-in or opt-out basis;65 and the third more 
ambitious option (option 3) would extend Option 2 to also allow third parties to bring 
representative actions on an opt-out basis.66 The consultation document noted that Option 
2 had the potential to provide an effective model for mass litigation generally, though may 
ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ĂŶ  ‘ŽǀĞƌůǇ ůŝƚŝŐŝŽƵƐ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?67 and that 
Option 3 would facilitate collective redress. As will be discussed later in relation to the new 
competition law Collective Proceedings mechanisms, the Consultation recognises the 
importance of appropriate funding mechanisms generally for civil litigation and, following 
the Taylor Report, recommends inter alia ƚŚĞ ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ  ?Ɛ ďǇ ƐŽůŝĐŝƚŽƌƐ ŝŶ
Scotland.68 Albeit in the context of personal ŝŶũƵƌǇ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? dĂǇůŽƌ ?Ɛ ZĞƉŽƌƚ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ Ă
 ‘ĂǀŝĚ ĂŶĚ 'ŽůŝĂƚŚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ
ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƐĞƚ ŽƵƚ ƚŽ ƌĞĐĂůŝďƌĂƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ  ‘ĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌŝĐ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?69 This description can be applied even more cogently in the context of 
collective consumer redress for competition law infringements.   
In the specific competition law context, section 19 of the Enterprise Act 2002 had earlier 
added section 47B to the Competition Act 1998, allowing follow-on damages claims to be 
brought before the CAT by a specified body on behalf of two or more consumers who have 
claims in respect of the same infringement,70  W ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?71
The representative body required the consent of the individuals to pursue their claims, ie it 
was an opt-in representative action.72 Section 47B was inserted to support an underlying 
aim of the Enterprise Act to reinforce the links between competition law and consumers.  
However, the only specified body was Which?  ?ƚŚĞŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?73 and there has 
only been one, albeit high-profile, section 47B claim:- ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǀ ::^ƉŽƌƚƐ
plc
74 in relation to Football Shirts.75 The claim was for compensatory damages and also 
                                                          
60
 The Scottish Civil Justice Council was established on May 28 2013 under the Scottish Civil Justice Council and 
Criminal Legal Assistance Act 2013.  
61
 See http://www.gov.scot/About/Review/taylor-review. 
62
 Consultation available at http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/01/9932. 
63
 Scottish Civil Courts Review Chapter 13 (Vol.2). 
64
 Consultation supra n63 paras 142-149. 
65
 Ibid paras. 150-162. 
66
 Ibid. paras 163-169. 
67
 /ďŝĚƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝĨ ?ƐǁĞƌĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ? 
68
 Ibid paras 54-55. 
69
 Ibid. para 24. 
70
 Section 47B(1) and (4). Subsections 9-10 make provision regarding the specification of a body by the 
Secretary of State. 
71
 See for instance, dŚĞ ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ǀ :: ^ƉŽƌƚƐ ƉůĐ(CAT Case 1078/7/9/07), a follow-on 
consumer representative action under these provisions before the CAT in relation to Replica Kits. 
72
 Section 47B(3). 
73
 Pursuant to Specified Body (Consumer Claims) Order 2005, SI 2005/2365. 
74
 Case no 1078/7/9/07.  
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contained an interesting claim for exemplary or restitutionary damages of 25% of the 
relevant turnover of the defendant.  Ultimately, this action, following a day of mediation, 
with only 144 consumers becoming party to the action, was settled on the basis of 
compensation up to a maximum of £20 per individual consumer,76 and the action was 
withdrawn. At least in this case it was relatively straightforward for claimants to prove 
purchase by production of the relevant football shirts, which changed regularly. This case 
was positive in demonstrating that some consumers could obtain reimbursement of their 
 ‘ŽǀĞƌĐŚĂƌŐĞ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĂƐƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƐŽůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?It should be noted that the 
defendant, JJB Sports, offered a gesture of goodwill, by offering a free England away shirt 
and a mug in return for production of a shirt of the relevant period and upon agreement not 
to pursue JJB further. Apparently around 12,000 consumers took up this offer, and the 
follow-on action therefore had a positive indirect effect. Another downside in relation to 
ƚŚŝƐ ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ
their costs.77 
The clear limitations of the specialist representative action introduced in 2002 under section 
47B of the 1998 Act, notably the low participation rates in opt-in schemes due to a lack of 
incentives,78 were acknowledged by the OFT which in 2007 recommended the introduction 
of an opt-out procedure specifically for competition law. Subsequently, in 2012 the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in ƚŚĞh<  ? ‘/^ ? ? ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĞĚŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐ ƚŽ
reinforce the system of private enforcement in the UK through important reforms.79 There 
has been considerable academic commentary and critique of the effectiveness of those 
earlier provisions,80 and there are important litigation strategy reasons why follow-on claims 
are not raised before the specialist court, the Competition Appeal Tribunal.81 The revised 
provisions of the Competition Act 1998 will enhance the role of the specialist court, the CAT 
by extending its competence to hear stand-alone actions as well as follow-on actions, and 
allow parties to seek injunctions as well as monetary awards.82 The key proposal by BIS, at 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
75
 As Replica Football Kit had become known in the CAT follow-on case. See discussion of the case and its 
background by Rodger, chapter 13, in B Rodger (ed) Landmark Cases in Competition Law: Around The World in 
Fourteen Stories (Kluwer Law International, 2012). 
76
 If receipts had been retained, see http://www.which.co.uk/news/2008/01/jjb-to-pay-fans-over-football-
shirt-rip-off-128985.jsp. 
77
 Note the subsequent judgment by the CAT in January 2009 re interim payment and costs, [2009] CAT 3.  
78
 See D,ǀŝŝĚĂŶĚ:WĞǇƐŶĞƌ ‘ŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ/ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĐƌŽƐƐhDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŝŶZŽĚŐĞƌ
(ed) 2014 supra.  
79
 ^ĞĞ/^ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ PŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶKƉƚŝŽŶƐ&ŽƌZĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ
/^  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ‘ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ŝůů P ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ WŽůŝĐǇ ZĞĨŽƌŵ ĂŶĚ Zesponses to Pre->ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ^ĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ? ?
January 2014. 
80
 See ZŽďĞƌƚƐŽŶ ?  ‘>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ  ? ? ? ? PdŚĞĞĂƌůǇĂƐĞ-ůĂǁ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŵƉ. L. J.  4(1) 
pp335-344 and  ‘>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ  ? ? ? ? P ƌĞĐĞŶƚĂƐĞ-ů ǁ PWĂƌƚ  ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?] Comp. L. J.  3(2) 
pp85-100. Rodger, B.  ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<ŽƵƌƚƐ PĂƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĂůůĐĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ?-  ? ? ? ?- Parts I and 
II  [2009] 2 Global Competition Litigation Review 93-114 and 136- ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>ĂǁůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞh<
Courts: A study of all cases 2009- ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? '>Z  ? ?- ? ? ? D &ƵƌƐĞ ?  ‘&ŽůůŽǁ-on Actions in the UK: 
>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵƌŽ ?: ? ? ?-103.
81
 /ďŝĚ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĞ ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ W ŬŵĂŶ ?  ‘WĞƌŝŽĚ ŽĨ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ ĨŽůůŽǁ-on competition cases: when does a 
 “ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ďĞĐŽŵĞĨŝŶĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: ? ? ?-421. 
82
 These key changes to the role and competence of the CAT have been addressed by A Andreangeli,  ‘dŚĞ
Changing structure of competition enforcement in the UK: The Competition Appeal Tribunal between present 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂŶĚĂŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: ?-30. Note that the power to award injunctions only relates 
to proceedings before the Tribunal in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and an interdict is not available 
in relation to Scottish proceedings. 
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least in the context of collective redress, was to recommend the adoption of an opt-out 
representative collective action for consumers and businesses (in follow-on and stand-alone 
claims),83 together with mechanisms for CAT approved collective settlements. Furthermore, 
there were proposals to introduce an innovative scheme to enable the competition 
authorities to certify a voluntary redress scheme.84 Each of these BIS recommendations was 
included in reforms to be made to the existing Competition Act regime, originally by clause 
82 and Schedule 7 of the Consumer Rights Bill, when the Bill was first introduced to 
Parliament on 23rd January 2014.   The Act was given Royal Assent on 26 March 2015 and 
the changes to the Competition Act 1998 regime, introduced section 81 and Schedule 8 to 
the 2015 Act, come into effect on a date appointed by statutory instrument. As indicated 
above, the Act contains provision to enable the CMA to certify a voluntary redress scheme, 
and one prominent academic commentator believes that this innovation may be more 
important in practice than reliance simply on a private enforcement model.85 However, it is 
suggested here that potentially the most significant reform is the introduction of an opt-out 
representative collective redress mechanism, and it is this aspect of the reforms that we will 
be focusing on in the remainder of the article, together with the related set of provisions for 
collective settlements.86  
 
The Key Features of the UK Collective Redress Model 
The competition law provisions of the Consumer Rights Act comprise s81 and Schedule 8, 
and effectively make changes to the Competition Act 1998 regime for private enforcement, 
as introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002. The new, revised section 47B of the Competition 
Act 1998 provides for both opt-out and opt-in collective proceedings before the CAT, and is 
no longer limited to opt-in proceedings. The introduction of a collective settlement 
mechanism,87 based on the Dutch model,88 should facilitate the collective settlement of 
claims, and there are identical parallel provisions on the authorisation of the settlement 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞǁŚĞƌĞĂŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞWƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐKƌĚĞƌ  ? ‘WK ? ?ŚĂƐŶŽƚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞ ?89 
The remaining sections of this article will focus on certification of the collective proceedings 
and the incentives to institute opt-out actions. However, the UK Parliamentary debates 
concerning these central aspects of an effective opt out procedure were clearly impacted by 
concerns about the consequences of potentially introducing an American style litigation 
process and culture. This tension was exemplified by the introductory remarks by the 
Secretary of State for Business, Vince Cable, at 2nd Reading of the Bill in the House of 
Commons on 28 January 2014. He noted the limitations in existing provision as follows:-  ‘/Ŷ
10 years, there has only been one collective action case in this country, and only one 10th of 
                                                          
83
 ^ĞĞ  ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ PĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƌĞĨŽƌŵ- ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? :ĂŶ
2013 available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-
501-private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf at 
paras 5.11-5.23. 
84
 Ibid at paras. 6.20-6.26. 
85
  See  ,ŽĚŐĞƐ  ‘Fast, Effective and Low Cost Redress: How Do Public and Private Enforcement and ADR 
Compare? , Ch 8 in Rodger (ed) 2014 supra. 
86
 For early discussion of the proposed reforms- ƐĞĞ ^ tŝƐŬŝŶŐ ? < ŝĞƚǌĞů ? D ,ĞƌƌŽŶ  ‘dŚĞ ZŝƐĞ ĂŶĚ ZŝƐĞ ŽĨ
Private Enforcement in the United Kingdom- Government Announces far-Reaching Overhaul of the 
Competition Law Private Actions Regime' [2013] 6 GCLR 78-77.  
87
 Sections 49A and 49B in relation to where a CPO has been made/has not been made respectively. 
88
 Introduced under the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims Act 2005. 
89
  Under s49(B). 
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 ?A?ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞĞůŝŐŝďůĞ ƐŝŐŶĞĚƵƉ ĨŽƌ ŝƚ ? ?90 Nonetheless he stressed:-  ‘tĞ
have tried to strike a careful balance. We do not want an American-style system of 
ƉƌŽĚŝŐŝŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĐŽƐƚůǇ ĂŶĚ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ŽŶůǇ ůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ? ?91 
Another opposition spokesperson similarly queried how the legislation ĐŽƵůĚ ‘bring benefit 
to competition law from the increased and enhanced perspective of such private actions, to 
ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂĐƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ? ?ǁŚŝůĞ ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ
the American-ƐƚǇůĞ ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?92  There was sporadic Parliamentary criticism of the 
 ‘ƐĐĂƌĞŵŽŶŐĞƌŝŶŐ ?93 regarding concerns over the allegedly highly litigious US society being 
replicated in the UK.94. Nonetheless, despite the manifold requirements under the US CP 
Rule 23 regarding certification of a class action and the judicial scrutiny regarding their 
satisfaction, the misconceived fear of an  ‘ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ-ƚǇƉĞ ? action required Government 
spokespersons to stress during the passage of the Bill the  ‘ƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐ ? built into the UK 
collective action model.95 These safeguards are effectively:- a requirement for the CAT to 
certify that a representative is suitable to bring proceedings.96 ; and a ban on exemplary 
damages awards and the prohibition on damages-based agreements.97 At all stages the 
Government rebuffed attempts to incorporate more specific certification rules within the 
legislation, on the basis that those would be included in Tribunal rules, which would be 
adopted after a full consultation process,98 and the CAT was deemed to be best placed to 
exercise the discretion which would be inherent in achieving the underlying aims of the 
legislation in applying those Rules.99 
 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 and Competition Law- Key Schedule 8 Provisions 
The key provision is the introduction of an amended s47B of the Competition Act. Section 
47B(1) allows two or more claims to which s47A applies,100 to be combined as collective 
proceedings,101 where they are commenced by a representative.102 The legislation provides 
                                                          
90
 Hansard, HC, 28 January 2014, Col 775. 
91
 Ibid., col. 776. 
92
 Stella Creasey, Hansard, HC, Committee Debate, 11
th
 March 2014, col.579 
93
 Baroness King of Bow, Grand Committee, House of Lords, 3
rd
 November 2014, Col. 570. 
94
 See for example Baroness Noakes, ibid at Col. 574. See also at col. 575 where she referred  to a  ‘US-style 
ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?in which she considered that opt-ŽƵƚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐĐŽƵůĚ  ‘ĞŶĚƵƉĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh^ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ĚŽŶŽƚƐĂƚŝƐĨǇĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŚĞĚŝĚnot indicate 
any source for this purported evidence. 
95
 See for instance Baroness Hayter of Kentish town, Grand Committee, House of Lords, 3
rd
 November 2014, 
Col. 579. See C Hodges and R Money-<ǇƌůĞ ‘^ĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚƐŝŶŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?DĂĂƐƚƌŝĐŚƚ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ
International and Comparative Law 477-504. 
96
 Baroness Neville-Rolfe, Grand Committee, House of Lords, 3
rd
 November 2014, Cols. 570-581. 
97
 More accurately, a provision that declares them to be unenforceable.  
98
 See http://www.catribunal.org.uk/247-8763/Draft-Tribunal-Rules.html, discussed further infra. 
99
 Baroness Neville-Rolfe, Grand Committee, House of Lords, 3
rd
 November 2014, Col.  582. See also Baroness 
Neville-Rolfe, Grand Committee, House of Lords, Report, 2
nd
 sitting, 24
th
 November 2014 cols. 743-746. 
100
 D&ƵƌƐĞ ? ‘&ŽůůŽǁ-ŽŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞh< P>ŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵƌŽ
C.J. 79-103. 
101
 S47B(3)-(b)the proceedings may combine claims which have been made in proceedings under section 47A 
and claims which have not,  
and (c) a claim which has been made in proceedings under section  
4547A may be continued in collective proceedings only with the  
consent of the person who made that claim. 
102
 S47B(2). 
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for the CAT to make a Collective Proceedings Order
103
 in relation to a claim only on the basis 
that there is:- an authorised representative;104 and the claims raise the same, similar or 
related issues of fact or law and are suitable for collective proceedings.105 This is a very 
broad definition of what can constitute a class where all class members have the same 
interest. A Collective Proceedings Order must include:-106 (a)authorisation of the person 
who brought the proceedings to act as the representative in those proceedings, 
(b)description of a class of persons whose claims are eligible  for inclusion in the 
proceedings, and (c)specification of the proceedings as opt-in collective proceedings107 or 
opt-out collective proceedings.108 Accordingly, a key aspect of the d ?Ɛ role will be to 
determine whether to specify the proceedings as opt-out collective proceedings. It should 
be noted that in such proceedings, any non-UK domiciled class member109 must opt-in by 
notifying the class representative.110 Section 47B(8) provides for authorisation of the class 
representative in collective proceedings whether or not that representative is a  ‘ĐůĂƐƐ 
ŵĞŵďĞƌ ? ?111 Another crucial provision is s47B(8)(b) which specifies that authorisation will 
only be granted:- if the Tribunal considers that it is just and reasonable for that person to 
act as a representative in those proceedings. ? Collective settlements may be approved under 
s49A where a Collective Proceedings Order has been made and the CAT is satisfied that the 
settlement is just and reasonable, and there are parallel provisions in s 49B of the amended 
Competition Act 1998  W in relation to eligibility for Collective Proceedings and appointment 
as a representative- for Collective Settlements where a Collective Proceedings Order has not 
been made. The legislative provision is sparse on the central issues regarding opt-out 
collective proceedings:- eligibility as a collective proceeding; whether it should be on an opt-
in or opt-out basis; and the appointment of a suitable class representative. Each of these 
issues is dealt with in fuller detail in the Tribunal Rules which were finalised for this 
purpose,112 following a period of consultation.113 
 
Certification of Collective Proceedings 
Throughout parliamentary debate on the Bill, the Government sought to avoid attempts to 
straight-jacket the Tribunal by legislative provision, and accordingly one must look beyond 
                                                          
103
 As required under s 47B(4) of the 1998 Act. 
104
 In s 47B(5)(a) of the Competition Act 1998. 
105
 In s 47B(6) of the Competition Act 1998.  
106
 S47B(7). 
107
 S 47B(10) provides that  ? “KƉƚ-in collective ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? are collective proceedings which are  
brought on behalf of each class member who opts in by notifying the  
representative, in a manner and by a time specified, that the claim  
should be included in the collective proceedings. ? 
108
  S47B(11) states that:-  ‘ “KƉƚ-out collective ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? are collective proceedings which are brought on 
behalf of each class member except ?  
(a)any class member who opts out by notifying the  
representative, in a manner and by a time specified, that the  
claim should not be included in the collective proceedings ? ?  
109
 Section 59(1B) provides that  ‘Sections 41, 42, 45 and 46 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act  
1982 apply for the purpose of determining whether a person is  
regarded as  “ĚŽŵŝĐŝůĞĚ in the United <ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? for the purposes of  
this Part. ? 
110
 Section 47B(11)(b). 
111
 S47B(8)(a). 
112
 Detail Tribunal Rules. 
113
 http://www.catribunal.org.uk/247-8763/Draft-Tribunal-Rules.html 
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the relatively sparse legislative text in revised Section 47B in particular to the Tribunal Rules 
on collective actions,114 introduced as part of a broader review of the Tribunal's rules 
following a formal consultation by the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills early in 
2015. We shall outline the relevant rules and how they may be interpreted, but it must be 
stressed that, at least in the early years of the new regime, as with all radical legislative 
changes, experiential learning will be important, not least for the Tribunal itself. The rules 
on collective actions and settlements are in part V of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 
2015. The relevant certification process provision is set out in Rules 76-78, Rule 78 of which 
provides as follows:- 
 
 ‘78. (1) The Tribunal may certify claims as eligible for inclusion in collective proceedings 
where, having regard to all the circumstances, it is satisfied by the proposed class 
representative that the claims sought to be included in the collective proceedings ?   
(a) are brought on behalf of an identifiable class of persons;  
(b) raise common issues; and  
(c) are suitable to be brought in collective proceedings. 
 
ŽŵŵŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝŶZƵůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ĩ ?ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?Ɛŝ ŝůĂƌŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨĨĂĐƚŽƌ
ůĂǁ ? ? reflecting the statutory provision in s47B(6). The potential difficulties in this context 
under the US CPR Rule 23 were demonstrated in Wal-Mart Stores Inc v Dukes.115 ,The 
application of similar requirements under the English CPR 19.6 in Emerald Supplies 
demonstrated their potential limitations in a business context, and certainly in relation to 
hybrid claims involving mid and end-purchasers from the same cartel.116  Nonetheless, the 
ŶĞǁƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƚĞƐƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞǁŝĚĞƌŝŶƐĐŽƉĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐĂŵĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ƚĞst under CPR 19.6 
and in principle many collective claims relating to aggregated end-purchaser/consumer 
overcharges should satisfy this test relatively easily. 
ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŝƐĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚƚŚĞdƌŝďƵŶĂůŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
proceedings, and whether they should be opt-in or opt-out,  under the criteria set out in 
Rule 78(2) and (3) respectively, as follows:-  
 
 ‘(2) In determining whether the claims are suitable to be brought in collective proceedings 
for the purposes of paragraph (1)(c), the Tribunal will take into account all matters it thinks 
fit, including but not limited to  ?   
 
(a) whether collective proceedings are an appropriate means for the fair and efficient 
resolution of the common issues;  
(b) the costs and the benefits of continuing the collective proceedings;  
(c) whether any separate proceedings making claims of the same or a similar nature have 
already been commenced by members of the class;  
(d) the size and the nature of the class;  
(e) whether it is possible to determine for any person whether he is or is not a member of 
the class;  
(f) whether the claims are suitable for an aggregate award of damages; and   
                                                          
114
 Detail Tribunal Rules, introduced under new paras. 15(B) and 15(C) of Schedule 4 to the Enterprise Act 
2002. 
115
 603 F.3d 571, 630 (9th Cir. 2010). 
116
 Emerald may be considered a peculiar case in this context. 
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(g) the availability of alternative dispute resolution and any other means of resolving the 
dispute.  
 
(3) In determining whether collective proceedings should be opt-in or opt-out proceedings, 
the Tribunal will take into account all matters it thinks fit, including but not limited to the  
following additional matters to those set out in paragraph (2) ?   
  
(a) the strength of the claims; and  
  
(b) whether it is practicable for the proceedings to be brought as opt-in collective 
proceedings, having regard to all the circumstances, including the estimated amount of 
damages that individual class members may recover. ?  
 
It is difficult to predict how these criteria will be applied in practice. In particular, ƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƐƚƐ
ĂŶĚ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ƚĞƐƚdoes not identify any particular recipients of such costs/benefits, how 
they will be calculated, and how the Tribunal should evaluate and determine an appropriate 
trade-off between costs and benefits to different parties- either intra-class or between the 
class and defendant(s). &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ?ƚĞƐƚƵŶĚĞƌZƵůĞ ? ? ? ?Ă ?, 
albeit only for the purpose of determining whether a claim should be opt-in or opt-out, is 
problematic at the certification stage.117 Application of this rule is also likely to favour 
follow-on actions, although most consumer claims will inevitably fall into this category. As 
indicated in discussing developments in US class action certification, a stringent certification 
examination is understandable and necessary in order to balance conflicting aims of the 
justice system. Nonetheless, where certification involves assessment of the strengths of 
claims, this may inevitably lead to lengthy, protracted interlocutory disputes, delaying 
justice and potentially disincentivising claimants from raising collective proceedings.  
 
Incentives I: Who can Claim- The Representative? 
The collective proceedings mechanisms are dependent on the claim being raised by a 
suitable class representative. However, the potential role for collective proceedings is likely 
to be greatly determined by the range of parties who may be deemed eligible to be a class 
representative. In particular, should lawyers/law firms be entitled to act as a 
representative? This was a key issue throughout the BIS consultation phase and 
Parliamentary debates on the Consumer Rights Bill. The BIS response in January 2013118  to 
its earlier consultation119 stressed the following policy decisions had been taken in this 
context:- 
 
 ‘5.30. Regarding what sort of private parties should be able to bring cases, the Government 
agrees that there could be a risk of abuse if legal firms, funders or special purpose vehicles 
established solely for the purpose of litigation were allowed to bring cases. Government 
believes that only those who have a genuine interest in the case, such as genuinely 
                                                          
117
 How do you measure the strength of a claim at the pre-disclosure stage? See Wal-Mart supra.  
118
 ^ĞĞ ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ PĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŽƉƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƌĞĨŽƌŵ- ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?:ĂŶ
2013 available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13-
501-private-actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf 
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 See B/^ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘WƌŝǀĂƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ>Ăǁ PŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶŽŶKƉƚŝŽŶƐ&ŽƌZĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ?. 
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representative bodies (such as trade associations or consumer associations) or those who 
have themselves suffered loss should be allowed to bring cases.  
 
5.31.  ‘For the avoidance of doubt, the Government proposes to abolish the requirement 
fora list of suitable bodies to be established by the Order of the Secretary of State and to 
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƌĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐƐƵŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇďĞŝŶŐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞdĂƚĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
 
dŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐůĞĂƌ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ĞǆĐůƵĚĞ ůĂǁ ĨŝƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ
 ? ‘^WsƐ ? ?ĨƌŽŵƋƵĂůŝĨǇŝŶŐĂƐĂclass action representative, but there is neither an express ban 
in the legislation nor the Tribunal rules, which provide  in Rule 77120 as follows:- 
 
 ‘(2) In determining whether it is just and reasonable for a person to act as the class 
representative, the Tribunal will consider whether that person ?   
(a) would fairly and adequately act in the interests of the class members;  
(b) does not have, in relation to the common issues for the class members, a material 
interest that is in conflict with the interests of class members;  
(c) (if there is more than one person seeking approval to act as the class representative in 
respect of the same claims) would be the most suitable person to act as such;  
 ?Ě ?ǁŝůůďĞĂďůĞƚŽƉĂǇƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĂďůĞĐŽƐƚƐŝĨŽƌĚĞƌed to do so;121 and  
(e) where an interim injunction is sought, will be able to satisfy any cross-undertaking in 
damages required by the Tribunal.  
 
77(3) In determining whether the proposed class representative would act fairly and 
adequately in the interests of the class members for the purposes of paragraph (2)(a), the 
Tribunal will take into account all the circumstances, including ?   
 
(a) whether the proposed class representative is a member of the class, and if so, his 
suitability to manage the proceedings;  
(b) if the proposed class representative is not a member of the class, whether it is a pre-
existing body and the nature and functions of that body;  
(c) whether the proposed class representative has prepared a plan for the collective 
proceedings that satisfactorily includes ?   
(i) a method for bringing the proceedings on behalf of represented persons and for notifying 
represented persons of the progress of the proceedings; and  
(ii) a procedure for governance and consultation which takes into account the size and 
nature of the class; and  
(d) any estimate of and/or details of arrangements as to costs, fees or disbursements which 
the Tribunal orders that the proposed class representative must provide. ? 
 
 Again there was considerable Parliamentary focus and concern regarding potential 
exploitation of the new collective mechanisms by the legal profession, exemplified by the 
following statement:-  ‘The ban on exemplary damages and damages-based agreements, 
                                                          
120
 Note that Rule 77(1) simply restates the statutory provision that a representative need not be a class 
member but that the class representative will be authorised only if it is just and reasonable to do so. 
121
 Note, although we will not deal with costs issues in this paper it is worth simply noting the contrast with the 
costs rules in the US system and this may continue to work as a major disincentive for class actions in the UK, 
depending on success probabilities. 
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while welcome, will not remove the huge incentive for lawyers and litigation funders to 
ŵĂŬĞ Ă ŚĂŶĚƐŽŵĞ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?122 There was an attempt to 
circumscribe the wide discretion of the Tribunal in this context by proposing amendments to 
the legislation to make express provision to ensure that lawyers, claims management 
organisations and others, who might gain from the litigation itself, would not be able to 
satisfy the just and reasonable test.123 Nonetheless the Government stressed that the basic 
provision should be applied by the most suitable body, the Tribunal, with discretion and it 
would be inappropriate to provide a prescriptive list of bodies suitable to act as a 
representative body.124 It is important to note that although most of the literature, debate 
and commentary on the reform of collective redress has focused on the specific issue of 
consumer redress, the Consumer Rights Act provisions here potentially provide for 
collective mechanisms for businesses and consumers. Indeed, to date, inevitably to some 
extent reflecting the absence of an appropriate mechanism and incentives for competition 
claims by groups of consumers, virtually all of the competition litigation in the UK has 
involved business claimants. The 2015 Act collective mechanisms may allow a number of 
direct or indirect business purchasers to join their claims together in a more effective way 
than was previously permitted,125 and although not the main driver of these provisions or 
their key target, this will enhance the deterrent impact of the primary competition 
legislation whilst also being pro-business in providing compensation to businesses harmed 
by illegal cartels. Accordingly, the Government rejected an amendment to the Bill which 
would limit those who could act as class representative to any appropriate consumer 
representative body or trade association and thereby effectively ĞǆĐůƵĚĞ ^D ?Ɛ ĨƌŽŵ
bringing forward collective actions.126 
However, the key issue and dilemma in devising an effective collective actions regime, and 
for the Tribunal to resolve in dealing with opt-out collective applications in particular, is how 
to apply the Rule 77 criteria in a way that facilitates and incentivises consumer redress but 
respects the Parliamentary concerns regarding over-incentivising lawyers. Under US Rule 23, 
the class representative is always a member of the class but in effect the appointment is 
nominal and all effective decision-making in a class action is taken by the relevant law firm. 
Class action settlements, and the relative fee arrangements, consequently require court 
approval.127 A central and as yet unresolved question is whether section 47B will be utilised 
primarily for class actions led by a class member or as a representative collective 
mechanism, and consequently what types of organisation may qualify as suitable 
representatives.128 If we reconsider US CPR Rule 23, aside from the prerequisite for 
commonality, the two key issues in the certification process were typicality and adequate 
representation. The former is aimed at avoiding a conflict of interests between the named 
representative and the class members; the latter requires the class action lawyer to be 
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someone who is harmed, i.e. the class action needs a lead claimant.   
20 
 
sufficiently qualified, experienced and competent to conduct class action litigation. Rule 77 
embodies aspects of both tests and it is unclear at whom the specific criteria in Rule 77 are 
aimed. Of course the representative may, as expressly provided for in amended s47B and 
Rule 77, be a class action member alone. There is no typicality requirement as such, as this 
would exclude the potential for a purely representative action, not led by a class member. 
However, there are considerable hurdles to be satisfied by a potential class member 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŶ ƐĂƚŝƐĨǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů  ‘ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ĨĂŝƌůǇ ĂŶĚ ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇ ? ƚĞƐƚ P- would an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚ ďĞ  ‘ƐƵŝƚĂďůĞ ? ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞ ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? able to pay the 
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĂďůĞĐŽƐƚƐ ŝĨŽƌĚĞƌĞĚƚŽĚŽƐŽ ? able to satisfy any cross-undertaking in 
damages required by the Tribunal. Of course, the latter two are largely dependent on the 
funding arrangements set in place prior to commencing collective proceedings, as discussed 
further below. The arrangement of a satisfactory claim management plan could of course be 
organised by the acting law firm, subject to funding arrangements, but it is uncertain how 
an individual class action representative can provide a satisfactory procedure for 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵ ĞǀĞŶ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĂŶ  ‘ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨ ĂďůĞ ? ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ŝŶ ŽƉƚ-out 
collective proceedings, where by its nature, claimants have not (been required to) 
individually become involved in the proceedings. Effectively, the class representative would 
have to satisfy tests modelled on the adequacy of representation test under the US model, 
which are aimed at the competency and expertise of counsel to act in a class action; and 
would face considerable cost and funding issues as discussed below.  
The representative model of collective proceedings, as opposed to the class action member 
representative, would probably better reflect the intention of BIS in proposing a modernised 
collective redress mechanism,  in order to enhance the prior (opt-in) representative model 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂĚ ? ĂƐ ŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚ ? ĂďŽǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŽĨ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ǀĂůƵĞ ? KŶůǇ tŚŝĐŚ ?  ?dŚĞ ŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?
Association) was entitled to undertake any representative actions under that procedure, 
whereas the Government preferred the introduction of an open-ended test for the Tribunal 
to determine suitability as a class representative under the revised collective proceedings 
rules rather than designating specific bodies competent to act. Nevertheless it was 
anticipated at all stages of the drafting and progress of the legislation that suitable 
consumer organisations, such as Which? would be involved in championing consumer rights 
through this process. However, their involvement would inevitably depend partly on 
priorities, resources and effective funding mechanisms.  This leaves the key issue as to 
whether other representative options may be available and satisfy the Rule 77 
requirements. Indeed, there was considerable debate over the last two years regarding 
whether law firms and Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) could act as class representatives. 
Given the absence of a typicality requirement this depends on the assessment of whether 
ƚŚŽƐĞ ďŽĚŝĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂĐƚ  ‘ĨĂŝƌůǇ ĂŶĚ ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇ ? ?whether there would be any  ‘ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ŽĨ
interest ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐůĂƐƐĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǀĂŐƵĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ZƵůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ď ?ĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞǁĂƐ ‘a pre-existing body and the nature and 
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ ďŽĚǇ ? ? Prima facie it would appear that it would be relatively 
straightforward for law firms to satisfy the first two requirements, based on the normal 
ethical and professional duties imposed on lawyers but each of these three issues would be 
more problematic for bodies specially constituted solely to pursue claims with a profit 
motive.  
Nonetheless, and particularly in relation to the issue of law firms as representatives, it is 
suggested here that any concerns should dissipate when the Tribunal Rules on Collective 
Proceedings are considered in depth. In addition to the issues already considered, regarding 
21 
 
certification and the class representative, the Rules provide for: notice of a Collective 
Proceedings Order in a manner prescribed by the Tribunal;129 the class representative to 
establish a class Register (which may be inspected by the Tribunal and other parties);130 the 
variation, revocation, sist or stay of a Collective Proceedings Order by the Tribunal;131 for 
case-management and disclosure by the Tribunal where necessary;132 for notice of any 
judgment order to be given by the class representative to the represented persons in a form 
and  manner prescribed by the Tribunal;133 rules on the assessment of individual damages 
from an aggregated sum;134 the Tribunal to make an Order detailing the requirements for 
the distribution of an award of damages.135 Even more significant are the detailed provisions 
in relation to an application for a Collective Settlement Approval Order.136 This requires 
details of the terms of the proposed settlement, including provisions on payments of costs 
and fees; specify how sums are to be paid and distributed and how class members will be 
notified of the application. The most significant provision requires a statement that the 
applicant believes the settlement to be fair and reasonable, supported by evidence as to the 
merits of the settlement.137 The Tribunal must determine whether the terms of the 
proposed settlement are just and reasonable138 taking into account a number of factors 
including (a) the amount and terms of the settlement, including any related provisions as to 
the payment of costs, fees and disbursements; (b) the number or estimated number of 
persons likely to be entitled to a share of the settlement; (c) the likelihood of judgment 
being obtained in the collective proceedings for an amount significantly in excess of the 
amount of the settlement; (d) the likely duration and cost of the collective proceedings if 
they proceeded to trial; (e) any opinion by an independent expert and any legal 
representative of the applicants.139 Furthermore, the representative must give notice of the 
terms of the settlement and its approval to represented persons in a form and manner 
prescribed by the Tribunal.140  
Accordingly, although the revised statutory scheme for certification and appointment of a 
ĐůĂƐƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŝƐƌĂƚŚĞƌďƌŝĞĨ ?ƚŚĞdƌŝďƵŶĂůƌƵůĞƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŵŽƌĞ ‘ĨůĞƐŚŽŶƚŚĞďŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚ
are aimed at avoiding conflicts of interest and adequacy of representation. Moreover, the 
Tribunal Rules establish a rigorous pre and post certification appraisal of just and 
reasonableness, and in particular the detailed case management and Tribunal approval 
mechanisms for all aspects of its Order-making and Settlement approving processes, should 
ensure both that defendants are adequately considered and that the interests of the mass 
opt-out claimants (who do not have a direct input into the court processes and outcomes) 
are adequately taken into account in achieving a fair and reasonable outcome to the 
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litigation process. The precise nature of the representative should be less significant, 
provided they can effectively represent the mass represented persons in an opt-out claim. 
Of course, the nature of the representative, and whether they will be over- or adequately 
incentivised to pursue this type of litigation, depends greatly on the funding mechanisms 
available.  
 
Incentives II- Funding 
It has already been emphasised that the availability of contingency fees for lawyers in the 
USA has been central in incentivising the raising of class actions on behalf of consumers. 
Class action damages recovery is an integral element of US antitrust enforcement, yet 
virtually all class actions are settled and those class settlements, including the fee payable to 
the successful class lawyer, are approved by court.141 In the legal systems of the UK, 
particularly England and Wales, there has been a considerable shift in the use of alternative 
legal fee arrangements over the last fifteen years.142 Conditional fee arrangements, 
involving a success percentage uplift (of up to 100%) of a standard fee, are common, albeit 
following the Jackson Report,143 the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 (LASPO), has prohibited the recovery of success fees and ATE insurance premiums 
from the unsuccessful party. Following the introduction of the Damages-Based Agreements 
Regulations 2013,144 damages-based agreements (DBAs) ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂůĂǁǇĞƌ ?ƐĨĞĞŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ
upon the success of the claim and is calculated as a percentage of the compensation 
received by the claimant, have been permissible generally in civil cases. The cap is generally 
set at 50% of the damages awarded (25% in personal injury cases) but does not affect the 
ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚƐ ? ĐŽƐƚ ůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? dhe introduction of DBAs generally in English civil procedure 
sought to incentivise lawyers to pursue more risky and work-intensive cases. Nonetheless, 
the original BIS consultation raised concerns about the availability of DBAs in conjunction 
with the new collective proceedings mechanisms. Although these concerns were considered 
ďǇĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŬĞǇƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƚŽďĞ ‘ŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ? ?145 and the Jackson Report had specifically 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?ƐĂƐĂǁĂǇŽĨĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?146 ƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ
consultation in January 2013147 stated:- 
 
 ‘5.62. Prohibiting the use of damages-based agreements (DBAs), sometimes called 
contingency fees, was one of the key safeguards highlighted by many respondents as 
necessary to ensure that an opt-out collective actionƐ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ Ă  ‘ůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?dŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŐƌĞĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚĂŶĚ
that allowing DBAs could encourage speculative litigation, thereby placing unjustified costs 
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on defendant businesses and creating an incentive for lawyers to focus only on the largest 
cases. 
 
5.63. The Government has therefore decided to prohibit DBAs in collective actions cases in 
the CAT. This will require an amendment to the LASPO Act 2012 for this new type of case. ? 
 
S47C(8) of the amended Competition Act 1998 provides statutory expression to the 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶďǇƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ a damages-based agreement is unenforceable if 
it relates to opt-out collective proceedings ? ?148 Hviid and Peysner have considered the 
incentives necessary for increased private enforcement activity:- they stressed that any opt-
out system would also benefit from the availability of contingency fees149 and an increase in 
potential damages awards (for instance treble or exemplary damages) to increase the value 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ  ‘ƉƌŝǌĞ ? ĨŽƌ ďŽƚŚ ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?150 Accordingly, a central 
conundrum to resolve is how prospective opt-out collective proceedings can be financed. 
Where the class representative is a consumer organisation, it could decide to underwrite 
the costs and liabilities of the proceedings, but inevitably there will be difficult decisions 
about the risks of involvement (notably costs), and the appropriate focus and prioritisation 
of their scarce resources by such bodies, which may limit the range of their activity. In 
relation to an actual class claimant representative, unless they were a wealthy, benevolent 
class member who could subsidise the action, what are the options? Prima facie, the fact 
that a DBA agreement is unenforceable would not appear to restrict the freedom of a 
potential representative to enter such an agreement, provided the matter of the fees is not 
litigated.151 However, at the stage when a fee arrangement would be agreed, the Tribunal 
would not as yet have certified the proceedings or authorised the representative, and 
accordingly any lawyer would be taking a risk in acting on this basis. Moreover, given the 
Tribunal powers under the Rules to approve all Collective Proceedings Settlements including 
fees, the unenforceability of any such DBA would inevitably be confirmed at that stage of 
the process. In the absence of a DBA incentive, law firms are unlikely to subsidise the 
interim costs of an action plus the risks of a costs award for an unsuccessful claim in favour 
of the defendant. After the Event Insurance has been utilised in B2B competition law claims, 
but would require a claimant152 to pay any premiums in advance. Given that LASPO 2012 
prevents the recovery of success fees and ATE premiums from a losing defendant, lawyers 
would need to be confident that the Tribunal would authorise the payment of those costs 
from under Tribunal Rule 93(7).153  
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The uncertainty on cost recovery suggests a potentially crucial role, particularly in relation 
to class claimant representative actions, for external investment in the form of Third Party 
Funding.154 There was an attempt to amend the legislation in Parliament to exclude such 
third party litigation funding agreements.155 However this straight-jacketing attempt was 
excluded by the Government as it accepted that third party funding may be necessary to 
ensure effective consumer redress where a representative claimant did not have a sufficient 
reserve of funds or could not persuade a law firm to act effectively pro bono. Indeed, this 
issue reflects the ambivalent approach of the Government, which sought to encourage 
effective consumer redress but was simultaneously conscious of the misapprehensions and 
misconceptions regarding the introduction of a US style funding and litigation cultures. The 
Government stressed during the passage of the Bill that blocking access to third party 
funding would unnecessarily constrain competition law private enforcement by limiting 
access to larger businesses and discouraging bodies organisations such as Which? from fully 
participating as a lead representative organisation.156 Similarly, third party funding could be 
provided where a law firm seeks to act as the representative, although this would be highly 
risky given the uncertainty regarding the application of the suitable representative criteria 
as set out in the Tribunal rules. Will third party funding be a viable option for class claimant 
representative actions? Would a third party funder engage directly with a class 
representative to determine the appropriate return on their investment? This return could 
be set at a similar level and basis as a damages-based agreement, but such damages related  
returns may not be approved by the Tribunal under Rule 93(7) in its determination of fees 
and disbursements to be met. The considerable uncertainty may disincentivise third party 
funders from involvement, although this may change in the light of practice, damages 
awards and Settlement Approvals by the Tribunal over a period of time. 
There are two further issues which may act as disincentives or discourage appropriate 
funding arrangements and thereby risk the success of the new collective proceedings 
mechanisms. 
The first is the potential impact of the applicability of settlement offers by defendants in the 
context of collective proceedings. The Rules on Settlement Offers are set out in Tribunal 
Rules 44-48, and essentially they replicate the cost consequences under CPR Rule 36 offers, 
ie defendants will not be liable for costs after the settlement offer by the defendant(s) if the 
final award is below the level of the settlement offer. dŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂůĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ
on the draft Tribunal Rules recommended the exclusion of settlement offers from the opt-
out collective action mechanism,157 primarily on the basis that it may incentivise the 
                                                          
154 In Arkin v Borchard Lines ([2005] EWCA Civ. 655), the claimant had been unsuccessful in an Article [101] 
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defendant to make a low settlement offer. This is not a particularly convincing argument per 
se, as it could apply generally to such settlement offers. However, the exclusion of 
settlement offers from the new collective proceedings regime should be supported on the 
basis that its introduction may unnecessarily shift the bargaining power in the litigation 
process away from the consumer to the business defendant, contrary to the underlying 
rationale in the introduction of the revised collective redress mechanism. More importantly, 
the introduction of general settlement offers would have important potential implications 
for the cost and funding cover of the litigation by the claimants- in particular the availability 
of settlement offers may prejudice the position of the class representative in making 
funding arrangements ex ante, because of the risk of a low settlement offer which may not 
cover costs or the risk of a subsequent lower award of damages which would then not 
include costs and jeopardise the claim and the funder. The statutory system of Collective 
Settlement, with Tribunal involvement in approving a settlement, provides a comprehensive 
solution, allows for the interests of all relevant parties and the underlying benefit of an 
effective collective proceedings mechanism to be taken into account. It is important that 
this system should not be short-circuited by a settlements offer process which is not 
appropriate in this consumer-focused context.   
The second is that section 47C(1) of the Competition Act prescribes the award of exemplary 
damages by the Tribunal in collective proceedings. Exemplary damages may potentially be 
awarded in a competition law damages claim,158 and their availability would certainly 
incentivise claimants and funders. However, this exclusion is not considered to be 
particularly significant given the limited circumstances in which such damages may be 
awardable, and consequently the general reticence of the English courts to make such 
damages awards in any event.159  
On the other hand, one option to help to fund opt-out cases- albeit ex post facto- would be 
to use unclaimed damages to cover all or part of a claimĂŶƚ ?ƐĐŽƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂŶǇ
success fee agreed with a legal representative and any insurance taken out.  The US has a 
developed cy pres award scheme160 and the Consumer Rights Act provides for unclaimed 
damages by represented persons in opt-out proceedings to be awarded to the Access to 
Justice Foundation.161 However the Act contains provision for the costs or expenses incurred 
by the class representative in connection with the proceedings to be paid to the 
representative by Order of the Tribunal.162 It is imperative that consumers should be the 
beneficiaries of redress, and that provision means mean that legal costs can be recovered 
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only after consumers have claimed their redress.
163
 Accordingly, the CAT can consider the 
suitability of a representative ?Ɛcosts and funding arrangements in applying Tribunal Rule 
92(4) which provides as follows:-  ‘tŚĞƌĞƚŚĞdƌŝďƵŶĂůŝƐŶŽƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƵŶĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ
damages pursuant to paragraph (3)(b), it may make an order directing that all or part of any 
undistributed damages is paid to the class representative in respect of all or part of any 
ĐŽƐƚƐ ?ĨĞĞƐŽƌĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶĐƵƌƌĞĚďǇŚŝŵŝŶĐŽŶĞĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? ? 
However, it is notable that there is no statutory provision regarding the unclaimed pot of 
compensation in relation to Collective Settlements. As opt-out Collective Proceedings are 
often likely to be resolved by Collective Settlement Approval Orders164 (or if available 
settlement offers) this may mean that the laudable aim of benefitting the charitable Access 
to Justice Foundation is not achieved. The relevant Tribunal Rule in relation to a Collective 
settlement Order, Rule 93(7) merely provides that in determining if the terms of a proposed 
Collective settlement are fair and reasonable, the Tribunal shall take into account all the 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ  ‘ ?Ő ? the provisions regarding the disposition of any unclaimed 
ďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?Distribution to the defendant is not precluded by this provision, 
and it will be interesting to note whether in practice the Tribunal will make any additional 
requirements such as payment to the AJF. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Schedule 8 of the Consumers Rights Act introduces various measures to facilitate and 
encourage competition litigation in the UK,165 and a key aspect, discussed in this article, is 
the legislative revision of the Competition Act 1998 to allow for opt-out collective 
proceedings (before the CAT) in the UK. This is a potentially significant innovation which 
may help to enhance consumer redress in respect of competition law infringements166 
whilst also increasing the deterrent effect of the competition rules. However, this article has 
demonstrated that a combination of the (sparse) statutory rules and (more detailed) 
Tribunal Rules on Collective Proceedings may limit the effectiveness of the new opt-out 
mechanism for consumer redress. There is uncertainty regarding the likely application by 
the Tribunal of the relevant provisions and Rules regarding certification and authorisation of 
ƚŚĞ ĐůĂƐƐ  ?ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ dƌŝďƵŶĂů ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ
should become clearer with practice. Generally there have been ambiguous messages as to 
whether collective proceedings are primarily designed for class actions represented by a 
class claimant or by a representative body. Funding is also central to the effectiveness of an 
opt-out model.  In particular, the need for effective management of claims would suggest 
that any body, including a collective claim SPV with suitable governance and decision-
making should qualify as a suitable class representative. In this context it is unclear, and 
certainly not supported by empirical evidence, why there was such concern throughout the 
consultation and Parliamentary processes regarding over-incentivised claims. It is argued 
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that the ban on Damages-Based Agreements, combined with the non-recovery of ATE and 
success fees under LASPO, may make it exceptionally difficult to fund an opt-out claim, 
particularly where third party funders would require to fund the pre-certification process- 
given the uncertainties identified. I would argue that there is a considerable incentivisation 
problem167 which has been driven during the debate by an irrational fear that contingency 
fees/DBAs would lead to excessive litigation and disproportionate gains for lawyers. These 
restrictions and uncertainties may inadvertently result in the collective proceedings 
mechanism being used primarily for common claims by businesses rather than consumers. It 
is also anticipated that many proceedings will result in Collective Settlement Proceedings 
using the new voluntary settlement mechanism rather than final judgment. However it is 
unfortunate that there are no statutory or Tribunal rule provisions for ADR,168 as earlier 
advocated in the BIS Consultation Documents in 2012 and 2013; and that the provisions on 
unclaimed compensation in Settlements are not parallel with those in damages awards. 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal supervisory role in statutory Settlement Proceedings is sufficient 
rationale to exclude normal settlement offers and their implications from the new statutory 
framework. More generally, it is clear that the US class action has been a central pillar of 
antitrust enforcement in the US and has demonstrated considerable success in ensuring 
consumer redress for antitrust infringements. This is predominately due to a combination of 
the opt-out class action, the availability of contingency fees and judicial case management 
ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?ĨĞĞƐ. It is argued that instead of 
Parliamentary (and wider) focus on irrational fears about the consequences of introducing a 
US style class action regime and over-incentivising lawyers, greater trust should have been 
placed in the Tribunal in the exercise of its supervisory role under the revised Tribunal Rules 
in relation to all aspects of the Collective Proceedings and Settlements regime.  
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